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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                        
No. 05-2260
                        
IN RE: TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
                                                        Debtor
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., 
                              Appellant
v.
ELIZABETH A.M. ROBINSON
MARK S. KENNEY, 
                  Trustee
                         
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-00234)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
                        
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 27, 2006
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed May 10, 2006)
                        
OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises out of the chapter 11 bankruptcy of debtors Trans World
    The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to review Robinson’s motion pursuant to 281
U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2) and 1334.  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 158.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158 and 1291. We have
plenary review of the District Court’s determination, exercising the same review of the
Bankruptcy Court’s decision as that exercised by the District Court.  Airline Pilots Ass’n
v. Continental Airlines (In re Continental Airlines), 125 F.3d 120, 128 (3d Cir. 1997). 
We review the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact only for clear error and its legal
determinations de novo.  Id.  
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Airlines, Inc. and certain of its affiliated entities (collectively, “TWA”).  The appellant is
American Airlines, Inc. (“American”), the purchaser of substantially all of TWA’s assets. 
On March 24, 2003, Elizabeth Robinson filed a motion in the Bankruptcy Court seeking
to compel American to pay her certain benefits under the Federal Longshoremen’s and
Harbor Workers’ Act (the “Longshoremen’s Act”).  Robinson argued that American
assumed this obligation under the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement (“APA”) in
which it purchased substantially all of the assets of TWA.  
On February 27, 2004, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order granting certain
relief requested by Robinson.  The Bankruptcy Court ordered American to make
workers’ compensation payments to Robinson in the amount of $1,866.32 per month,
commencing April 9, 2001.  The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s order. 
American argues that the Bankruptcy Court and District Court were incorrect in their
conclusion that American had assumed any liability to pay Robinson pursuant to the
APA.  We will affirm the order of the District Court.1
3I.
Robinson is a former flight attendant of TWA who sustained a work-related injury
during a flight between Paris and New York on January 31, 1984.  She was permanently
disabled.  Shortly thereafter, she began receiving benefits in accordance with a collective
bargaining agreement between TWA and the Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants (the “IFFA”), dated April 12, 1983 (the “CBA”).  Article 20(D)(2) of the
CBA provided that “[t]he Company will provide benefits for the Flight Attendants in
International Operations in accordance with either the Workers’ Compensation laws of
the State of New York or the Federal Longshoremen’s Act, whichever provides the
higher benefits.” App. 220.  At the time of Robinson’s injury, the Longshoremen’s Act
provided higher benefits than those provided under New York state law.  Accordingly,
TWA became obligated to and provided benefits to Robinson in accordance with the
union contract at the higher Longshoremen’s Act level.  
On August 13, 1992, TWA and the IFFA entered into an amended collective
bargaining agreement (the “Amended CBA”).  Though American has been unable to
produce the actual Amended CBA, American now asserts that the Amended CBA
“clarified” that permanently disabled employees were not entitled to Longshoremen’s
Act benefits.  Regardless of this purported intended meaning of the Amended CBA,
TWA continued paying Robinson’s Longshoremen’s Act benefits.  
On January 9, 2001, TWA and American entered into the APA, whereby
4American agreed to purchase substantially all of TWA’s assets, subject to an auction and
sale pursuant to section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Under the APA, American agreed
to assume “[a]ll workers’ compensation obligations for all employees of TWA and the
other Sellers as of the Closing Date calculated in accordance with methods, principles,
practices and policies employed in the preparation and presentation of the September
Balance Sheet and with generally accepted accounting principles consistently applied.” 
App. 242-243.  The next day, on January 10, 2001, TWA filed voluntary petitions for
relief under chapter 11.  On March 12, 2001, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order
approving the sale of substantially all of TWA’s assets to American in accordance with
the terms of the APA.  At about this time, TWA ceased paying Longshoremen’s Act
benefits to Robinson.  However, TWA’s insurance carrier continued to pay her New
York State workers’ compensation benefits.  
In December 2002, TWA and Robinson entered into a settlement agreement,
whereby TWA paid her $25,000 for settlement of the five proofs of claims she had filed
against TWA in the bankruptcy proceeding.  However, American was not a party to this
post-APA settlement agreement.  On March 24, 2003, Robinson filed a motion with the
Bankruptcy Court seeking to compel American to pay her the benefits she believed she
was entitled to under the Longshoremen’s Act.  The Bankruptcy Court reviewed
evidence and took testimony.  On February 27, 2004, the Bankruptcy Court entered an
order granting the relief requested in Robinson’s motion.  The Court ordered American
5to make workers’ compensation payments to Robinson in the amount of $1,866.32 per
month, retroactive to April 9, 2001.  All accrued but as yet unpaid monthly payments
were to be calculated with interest from the dates of accrual at the rate established by 28
U.S.C. § 1961.   The Bankruptcy Court also issued a letter opinion setting forth its
reasoning: first, TWA had a continuing obligation to Robinson that was not extinguished
by the Amended CBA; second, American assumed the ongoing obligation to Robinson
by virtue of the terms of the APA; and, third, Robinson’s settlement with TWA did not
affect American’s obligation to her.   American appealed the order of the Bankruptcy
Court to the District Court.  On March 28, 2005, the District Court entered an order
affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s order.  
II.
American now advances three arguments on appeal.  First, American argues that
TWA had no obligation to provide Robinson with Longshoremen’s Act benefits after the
effective date of the Amended CBA (August 13, 1992), which American argues
eliminated TWA’s obligation to provide Longshoremen’s Act benefits to permanently
disabled employees.  Second, American argues in the alternative, even if TWA did have
an obligation to provide Robinson with Longshoremen’s Act benefits under the
Amended CBA, American did not assume that liability, and, even if it did assume that
liability, the total amount of such obligation was no more than $446.30, the pro-rata
amount of TWA’s Longshoremen’s Act obligation to Robinson as of the closing date of
6the sale to American.  Third, American argues that, as a successor of TWA, it was
released of any obligation to Robinson by the December 2002 settlement agreement
between TWA and Robinson.  As discussed below, we find these arguments
unpersuasive.  
A.
The pivotal issues are, first, whether, at the time of the APA, TWA had an
obligation to pay Robinson, and, second, what “obligation” was assumed by American by
virtue of the APA.  American argues that TWA no longer had an obligation to pay
Robinson’s Longshoremen’s Act benefits under the Amended CBA.  We find this
unconvincing.  First, we note that this does not appear to have been TWA’s
interpretation of the Amended CBA.  TWA continued to pay Robinson Longshoremen’s
Act benefits for more than eight years after the effective date of the Amended CBA and
until its bankruptcy and sale of substantially all assets to American.  Second, the
Amended CBA specifically states that TWA “agrees that it will not challenge nor attempt
to reduce any permanent disability benefits, mistakenly awarded prior to the effective
date of the new Agreement and computed using the Federal Longshoremen’s and Harbor
Worker’s Act....”  App. 820 (emphasis omitted).  Thus, even if we accept American’s
argument that the Amended CBA was designed to “clarify” that permanently disabled
employees are not entitled to Longshoremen’s Act benefits, the Amended CBA was
clearly intended only to forestall claims by future disabled employees and not to apply
7retroactively to those employees already receiving benefits.  Therefore, we do not believe
that the Bankruptcy Court erred in its conclusion with respect to the effect of the
Amended CBA.  American’s argument is belied both by the extrinsic evidence of TWA’s
continued payments to Robinson and the plain language of the Amended CBA.
American next argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that American
had assumed any of TWA’s obligation to Robinson under the APA.  American also
argues that, if we find that it is obligated to Robinson under the APA, we should find that
it is only obligated to pay Robinson for $446.30, which American argues is the pro-rata
amount of TWA’s Longshoremen’s Act obligation to Robinson as of the APA’s closing
date.  We find these arguments equally unpersuasive.  
When American purchased substantially all of TWA’s assets, it agreed to assume
“[a]ll workers’ compensation obligations for all employees of TWA and the other Sellers
as of the Closing Date calculated in accordance with methods, principles, practices and
policies employed in the preparation and presentation of the September Balance Sheet
and with generally accepted accounting principles consistently applied.”  App. 243.  The
Bankruptcy Court found that the obligation assumed by American pursuant to the APA
was based upon the calculation of worker’s compensation obligations as then set forth in
TWA’s records.  Further, it found that TWA’s own accounting reflected its continued
obligation to pay Robinson $1,866.32 per month.  The Bankruptcy Court concluded that
the term “all worker’s compensation obligations” included TWA’s obligations to pay
8Robinson at the higher Longshoreman’s Act rate.  We will not disturb the Bankruptcy
Court’s interpretation of the APA.  
B.
Finally, we find no error in the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that Robinson’s
December 2002 settlement with TWA did not extinguish American’s obligation to pay
benefits to Robinson.  As the Bankruptcy Court observed, American’s assumption of
TWA’s obligation to Robinson occurred on April 9, 2001 when the APA became
effective.  Because Robinson’s settlement with TWA was executed after American had
already assumed the obligation, the settlement agreement did not encompass American’s
separate obligation to Robinson.  Moreover, as the Bankruptcy Court noted, the
settlement agreement released the “Debtors” and the “Estate”; it did not release successor
entities such as American.  Further, the release provision specifically provides that
“nothing herein shall be construed or operate in any way to alter or release ... American
Airlines, Inc. (“American”) from any alleged liability they may have to Robinson.”  App.
354.  Thus, the release specifically carved out any claim Robinson might have against
American.  In addition, as the Bankruptcy Court observed, American was not a party to
the settlement agreement and does not appear to have even been aware of the agreement
until after it was executed.  The Bankruptcy Court found that it was “quite apparent from
the settlement agreement that TWA thought Ms. Robinson had a continuing right to
assert a claim against American.”  We find no error in the Bankruptcy Court’s analysis or
9conclusion in this regard.  
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court affirming
the order of the Bankruptcy Court.  
